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ABSTRACT
There have been 329 post-conviction DNA exonerations in America to date. Forty-seven percent of these wrongful convictions
are attributable, in some way, to unreliable forensic evidence being used against the defendant, including unreliable firearms-
identification evidence. Some firearms examiners testify that they can match tool-marks produced by a suspect weapon to
suspect ammunition, but in recent years such claims--termed individualization--have been significantly undermined, including
by the National Research Council. However, challenges concerning the veracity of such evidence are routinely rejected
by the courts. In so ruling, courts rely on two particular finality interests: namely preventing a flood of frivolous claims
and incentivizing defense counsel to get it right the first time. This Article argues that this pattern in judicial reasoning is
problematic. This is because it overlooks the struggle both jurors and lawyers have when it comes to accurately engaging with
scientific evidence: Jurors are generally not science-literate, but they are nevertheless science-thirsty with inflated expectations
of scientific theory and a tendency to find comfort in alleged expert certainty. Lawyers, on the other hand, have blunt tools
to handle scientific evidence, including their restricted scientific knowledge, limited resources, and low-impact adversarial
arsenal. This Article explores these struggles and encourages judges to rethink their reliance on finality when faced with
challenges concerning the veracity of firearms-identification evidence.
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*458  I. INTRODUCTION
Firearms-identification evidence has been admitted into American courtrooms since the early 1990s. 1  Firearms identification
is premised on the notion that a weapon leaves unique tool-marks on the ammunition it fires and that these marks are reproduced
each time the weapon is discharged. 2  Using these markings, many firearms examiners believe they can conclude that a
particular gun fired a particular bullet “to the exclusion of all other[s].” 3  Such claims are termed individualization. 4  However,
in its 2009 landmark report--Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (Forensic Science Report)--
the National Research Council (NRC) raised significant concerns about this discipline's scientific underpinnings. 5  The report
coincided with, and in some instances propelled, efforts by numerous American courts to discourage *459  individualization
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testimony and curtail the language experts use to connect weapons to suspect ammunition. 6  These courts began instructing
firearms experts to replace matches and degrees of certainty with descriptions of observations and phrases such as more likely
than not. 7
In light of this conservative shift by some courts, and along with increased national initiatives towards improving the use and
reliability of forensic science since 2009, 8  it is unsurprising that defendants have continued to challenge firearms-identification
evidence admitted against them at trial. However, some trial courts still allow experts to testify unfettered, and appellate courts
routinely reject challenges to that testimony. 9
The obvious reason for this pattern in judicial decision-making is finality. Judges and scholars routinely argue that restricting
post-conviction review and increasing the finality of judgments benefits society. 10  The term finality is “shorthand for a
collection of interests scholars assume are furthered by any restrictions on review.” 11  These interests include ensuring respect
for criminal judgments, conserving state resources, furthering the efficiency and deterrent and educational functions of criminal
law, satisfying the human need for *460  closure, incentivizing defense counsel to “get it right first time” and preventing a
flood of frivolous claims from masking the fewer, credible ones. 12
These latter two interests are prominent in post-2009 cases where courts have rejected challenges concerning firearms-
identification evidence. In relation to preventing frivolous claims from flooding the system, courts often conclude that the
admission of such evidence was non-prejudicial in light of other evidence against the defendant. In other words, courts are
terming the legally sound or unsound admission of firearms-identification evidence as immaterial. However, this rationale
arguably overlooks the high impact scientific evidence has on jurors and the difficulty they have in accurately evaluating
scientific evidence. In relation to incentivizing defense counsel, the courts emphasize the importance of the adversarial system--
defense counsel's ability to weed out frailties in forensic evidence via cross-examination. But again, this view arguably overlooks
the difficulties lawyers have in resourcing, making, and understanding challenges to forensic evidence.
This Article examines the conflict between finality interests and the impact of firearms-identification evidence. Part II outlines
the theory of finality. Part III considers the process of firearms identification, the recent criticism aimed at it, and the initial
conservative shift in judicial approaches to firearms-identification evidence. Part IV reviews recent judicial responses to
challenges to admitting this evidence by highlighting the influence and implications of finality on judicial decision-making.
Part IV will also expand upon how jurors and lawyers engage with forensic evidence in order to demonstrate how the courts,
by favoring finality, are arguably overlooking the difficulties these groups have in handling such evidence. Part V concludes
that the courts should consider taking new perspectives on these finality interests and more meaningfully consider the issues
that arise when law consumes forensic science in this way.
*461  II. THE THEORY OF FINALITY
The main reason courts routinely reject challenges to firearms-identification evidence is finality. The concept of finality
developed out of a taxonomy detailed by Professor Paul M. Bator in his landmark 1963 article--Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners. 13  Professor Bator “laid the intellectual groundwork for the Supreme Court's
posttrial review jurisprudence and has been cited in hundreds of law review articles and court opinions. Bator argued that the
finality of criminal judgments serves important interests that are harmed by expansions of posttrial rights.” 14
The term “‘finality’ is shorthand for a collection of interests scholars assume are furthered by any restrictions on review.” 15
These interests include ensuring respect for criminal judgments; conserving state resources; furthering the efficiency, deterrent,
and educational functions of criminal law; satisfying the human need for closure; incentivizing defense counsel to get it right
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the first time; and preventing a flood of frivolous claims from masking the fewer, credible ones. 16  These latter two interests
are prominent in post-2009 cases where courts have rejected challenges to the admissibility of firearms-identification evidence.
Finality is believed to provide significant benefits, but when finality is employed as a monolithic “trump card” by judges, it
may encourage an abuse of process. 17  When considering appeals, judges must balance society's interests in finality against
defendants' rights. 18  Notably, finality serves the interests of defendants too: their interests in moving on in their lives and not
being subject to repetitive trials that wear down their resources and stamina. 19  Yet the scales are not commonly tipped in favor
of defendants, and finality is often used as a “trump card that presumptively outranks defendants' interests.” 20  For example, the
Supreme Court of the United States has *462  gone so far as to deny a defendant access to DNA evidence that could prove his
innocence based, in part, on the assumption that it would harm the unspecified “traditional [interest in] finality.” 21  As Professor
Laurie Levenson states, “The criminal justice system is obsessed with finality. While it professes to focus on obtaining fair and
accurate results, the goal of finality is never far away.” 22
Finality has a significant influence on legal discourse. Judges and scholars routinely assert that restricting defendants' post-
conviction arsenal benefits society. Courts have been criticized for not expanding on how finality benefits society, with some
even arguing that such restrictions can “harm the very interests increased finality is presumed to protect.” 23  Restrictions on
posttrial review, while conserving judicial and prosecutorial resources, may nonetheless harm society by preventing wrongful
incarcerations from being remedied, have no beneficial effects on the quality of legal representation for defendants, and
increase recidivism. 24  Judges are supposed to weigh these interests singularly and not view finality as a “monolithic interest
of presumptive importance.” 25  But this is often not the case--many courts rationalize their judgments with a simple reference
to a general societal interest in finality. And some courts make no mention of the concept at all.
This identifiable pattern, although indirect, can be found in post-2009 cases where courts have rejected challenges to the
admissibility of firearms-identification evidence. These cases show that courts regularly focus on two societal interests allegedly
furthered by finality: preventing frivolous claims from flooding the appellate system and incentivizing defense counsel to get
it right the first time. 26
Regarding the former, courts often conclude that admitting this evidence was non-prejudicial in light of other evidence against
the defendant. 27  In other words, courts classify either the legally sound, or unsound, admission of firearms-identification
evidence as *463  immaterial. However, this rationale overlooks the impact this type of scientific evidence has on jurors and
the special trust jurors place in this evidence and in expert witnesses. 28  In fact, studies show that jurors rate firearms examiners
among the most honest, competent, and influential experts. 29
Regarding the latter, incentivizing defense counsel, the courts emphasize the importance of the adversarial system and defense
counsel's ability to cross-examine. 30  But this view overlooks the limitations of the adversarial process and the inherent
difficulties with making a legal challenge to forensic evidence. As consumers of science, lawyers (including judges) “have very
little understanding of the product they are buying.” 31
These are both valid finality interests. As Kim explains:
[F]ew would argue that a defendant convicted at trial by a mountain of properly admitted evidence should
be granted a new trial based on a claim that a minor piece of evidence was improperly admitted .... In such
a case, reversing the conviction would simply waste resources on a new trial, the result of which would
likely be another conviction. Even worse, if the prosecutor chose not to retry the defendant, a reversal
would allow a guilty defendant to go free on a technicality. Similarly, a defendant whose attorney withheld
certain evidence at trial for sound strategic reasons generally cannot obtain a new trial in order to present
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this “sandbagged” evidence. Allowing a new trial under such circumstances would give the defendant an
unfair second opportunity to avoid conviction. 32
*464  These rationales, however, overlook important issues that arise when law consumes science in criminal courtrooms.
“Since neither law nor science is uncomplicated, few should expect their marriage to be.” 33  The courts' emphasis on defense
counsel's performance first overlooks the difficulties lawyers have in obtaining adequate resources to make and understand
challenges to forensic evidence. Also overlooked are the limitations of the adversarial process itself; the adversarial process
neither always showcases a full picture of relevant scientific evidence nor dilutes unreliable evidence in the eyes of jurors.
Second, the courts' dismissal of the importance of forensic evidence, especially when expert opinion links the defendant to a
suspect weapon (particularly in the terms of a “match”), overlooks the persuasive impact scientific evidence has on jurors. 34
III. FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION, CRITICISM, AND THE INITIAL
CONSERVATIVE SHIFT IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Despite some early criticism, firearms-identification evidence has been admitted into American courtrooms since the early
1900s. 35  Since then, the discipline has satisfied both of the leading standards for the admissibility of expert evidence: the
“general acceptance” standard set out in Frye v. United States 36  in 1923 and the “flexible, factor-based approach” 37  detailed
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 38  in 1993. 39  Currently, Daubert
generally governs the admissibility of scientific expert evidence. 40  Daubert charges courts to examine the principles and
methodologies behind proffered scientific evidence and not simply whether the expert's conclusions drawn from the evidence
are generally accepted in the scientific community. 41  Daubert lists five key factors for judges to consider when analyzing
*465  the reliability of expert testimony: (1) whether a method can or has been tested, (2) the known or potential rate of error,
(3) whether the method has been subjected to peer review, (4) whether there are standards controlling the method's operation,
and (5) the general acceptance of the method within the relevant community. 42
Firearms identification is premised on the notion that a weapon leaves unique tool-marks on the ammunition it fires and that
these marks are reproduced each time the weapon is discharged. 43  When the hard metal of an internal part of a gun connects
with the softer metal of the ammunition, it makes a tool-mark on the ammunition. 44  Tool-marks can be divided into class,
subclass, and individual characteristics. 45  Class characteristics are “distinctively designed features” and will be present on
every tool in that class. 46  And individual characteristics are unique to a particular tool and consist of purportedly random,
microscopic imperfections and irregularities present on the tool's surface. 47  Subclass characteristics straddle the line between
class and individual characteristics. 48  Subclass characteristics arise when manufacturing processes create batches of tools that
are similar to each other but distinct from other tools of the same class. 49  Thus, many firearms examiners believe they can
examine these marks and conclude that a particular gun fired a particular bullet to the exclusion of all others. 50
*466  In the late 1990s, the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) drafted a protocol (AFTE Protocol)
for experts to follow during their examinations. 51
Presently, the AFTE Protocol is the industry standard by which examiners conduct their examinations. Under the AFTE
Protocol, an examiner may make one of the following four conclusions: (1) identification, (2) inconclusive, (3) elimination, or
(4) unsuitable for comparison. To make an “identification” (i.e., a “match”), there must be “sufficient agreement” between the
tool-marks present on ammunition found at a crime scene and a test cartridge fired from a suspect weapon. 52
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Despite this protocol and the routine admission of firearms-identification evidence, the discipline came under significant
criticism in 2008 and 2009. In 2008, the National Research Council of the National Academies published its Ballistic Imaging
Report, which focused on the feasibility of a national ballistics database. 53  The Ballistic Imaging Report was not intended to
provide an overall assessment of firearms identification as a discipline. But in assessing the feasibility of a national ballistics
database, the report also considered the uniqueness of firearms-related tool-marks and found that a definitive correlation had
not been fully demonstrated. 54  *467  Moreover, in 2009, the National Academy of Sciences published its landmark report,
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, 55  which was commissioned by Congress in recognition
that significant improvements were needed across the forensic science disciplines. The Academy was asked to report on the
past, present, and future use of forensic science in America, 56  and after two years of collaborating with legal and scientific
scholars and practitioners 57  and sixteen days of testimony involving over eighty witnesses, 58  the Academy issued a report
containing its findings.
The Forensic Science Report concluded that the forensic-science system had serious problems, 59  faced many challenges, 60
and was responsible for multiple wrongful convictions. 61  First, it concluded that “no forensic method has been rigorously
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and
a specific individual or source,” except for DNA analysis. 62  Second, it concluded that the existing legal framework governing
the admissibility of forensic evidence in the United States was inadequate for resolving the identified problems. 63
Regarding firearms identification, the Forensic Science Report found that class characteristics could be useful “in narrowing the
pool of tools that may have left a distinctive mark” 64  and that individual characteristics “might, in some cases, be distinctive
enough to suggest one particular source.” 65  But overall, the report concluded that the “scientific knowledge base for tool
mark and firearms *468  analysis is fairly limited.” 66  In order to make the process of individualization more precise and
consistent, the report concluded that more studies were necessary. 67  It further concluded that the AFTE Protocol was not
defined sufficiently for examiners to follow, particularly for when an examiner can be said to have “matched” two samples. 68
The report berated the protocol: “This AFTE document, which is the best guidance available for the field of tool mark
identification, does not even consider, let alone address, questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability, or the number
of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of confidence.” 69
The Forensic Science Report followed a conservative shift by some courts regarding firearms-identification evidence. Prior to
the report, a number of courts curtailed testimony given by firearms experts because individualization claims were unsupported
or misleading. In United States v. Green, 70  the trial court admitted expert testimony but refused to allow the expert to conclude
that the shell casings came from a specific pistol to the exclusion of every other firearm: “That conclusion--that there is a
definitive match-- stretches well beyond [the expert's] data and methodology.” 71  The expert was permitted to describe his
observations and comparisons regarding the shell casings. 72
The same court considered a similar challenge weeks later in United States v. Monteiro. 73  In Monteiro, the defendant sought
to exclude expert testimony that suspect cartridge cases matched firearms linked to him. 74  The court rejected the defendant's
challenge, finding that the underlying scientific principle of individualization in firearm identification was valid. 75  But on the
basis that an identification is largely subjective and there is no existing reliable statistical or scientific methodology that allows
an expert to testify to a match to an absolute certainty, the expert was *469  only allowed to testify to a “reasonable degree
of ballistic certainty.” 76
Similarly, in United States v. Diaz, 77  the court found that individualization claims in the firearms-identification field were not
supported. Thus, the court only allowed the examiners to testify “that a match has been made to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty
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in the ballistics field.”’ 78  And in United States v. Glynn, 79  the trend continued. In Glynn, the court concluded that allowing
the examiner to testify that he had matched ammunition to a particular gun “to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” would
“seriously mislead the jury as to the nature of the expertise involved.” 80  To resolve this problem, the court (1) limited the
expert to testifying that a firearms match was “more likely than not;” (2) prevented the expert from testifying that he reached
his conclusions to any degree of certainty; and (3) prevented the expert from testifying that ballistics was a science. 81
After the Forensic Science Report was published, some courts continued the conservative trend. For example, in United States
v. Taylor, 82  the defendant moved to exclude firearms-identification evidence showing that his rifle could be matched to
suspect ammunition in a racketeering prosecution. 83  The Taylor court considered the Forensic Science Report in the context
of Daubert's controlling-standards factors. The court found, “Arguably the biggest obstacle facing any firearms examiner is
that there is no such thing as a ‘perfect match.”’ 84  The court partially attributed this to the circular nature of the AFTE Theory
of Identification, which “does not provide any uniform numerical standard examiners can use to determine whether or not there
is a match.” 85  Thus, much is left to the subjective eye of the examiner. 86  The court acknowledged that the Forensic Science
Report had recognized this problem but did not indicate whether such criticism favored admission of expert *470  testimony. 87
Yet, the court noted that the AFTE Theory met the generally accepted standard because it was widely accepted, although
not universally followed, by trained firearms examiners. 88  In the end, the Taylor court admitted the firearms-identification
evidence but limited the examiner to testifying that the ammunition came from the defendant's rifle within a “reasonable degree
of certainty in the firearms examination field.” 89
A review of challenges to firearms-identification evidence decided post-2005 shows that a number of American courts have
changed their approach to the admissibility of firearms-identification evidence, “moving firearms examiners away from making
claims of individualization by restricting examiners to specific terminology and phrases, which allegedly reflect less absolute
conclusions.” 90  Overall, courts have seemingly taken this approach because of concerns about the subjectivity of firearms
identification and its lack of empirical underpinnings for claims of individualization. 91  The extent to which both this shift has
continued post-2009 and has been influenced by finality interests is considered in Part IV.
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES TO FIREARMS-IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE, THE INFLUENCE OF FINALITY, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
As mentioned above, when rejecting challenges to firearms-identification evidence, courts are seemingly drawing upon two
particular finality interests, namely the prevention of frivolous claims from flooding the system and incentivizing defense
counsel.
A. Preventing a Flood of Frivolous Claims
Preventing courts from being flooded with trivial claims is a very significant finality interest that links closely with conserving
resources and maintaining efficiency. When rejecting challenges to *471  firearms-identification evidence, courts often
conclude that admitting the firearms-identification evidence was non-prejudicial or harmless in light of other evidence against
the defendant. In other words, courts are terming the legally sound, or unsound, admission of firearms-identification evidence--
even when that evidence is presented with a greater degree of certainty than can be scientifically supported--as immaterial. This
approach, however, overlooks a bundle of interrelated issues: jurors' inflated expectations of science, their comfort in alleged
expert certainty, and their difficulty in engaging accurately with scientific evidence.
Numerous cases demonstrate courts employing this rationale. In United States v. Perkins, 92  the defendant challenged the
admission of expert testimony showing that ammunition found at the crime scene was fired by two different weapons, which
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had not been recovered. 93  After refusing to engage with the issue fully, as the defendant did not object to the admission of the
evidence at trial, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit commented, “Moreover, this testimony was not of
particular importance in this trial .... The expert testimony at issue here merely corroborated the evidence of the victims, the
accomplice and the videotape. Without this tool mark evidence, the prosecution's case would still have been overwhelming.” 94
Other cases are more troubling as they presume (1) that the adversarial system is effective at weeding out frailties in forensic
evidence even when experts have made individualization claims (or claims close to individualization) and (2) that jurors engage
with scientific testimony accurately.
Jones v United States 95  exemplifies the former issue. In that case, the defendant argued that the trial court should have at least
precluded government experts from stating their conclusions with “absolute certainty excluding all other possible firearms.” 96
The court acknowledged that there was a “growing consensus that firearms examiners should testify only to a reasonable
degree of certainty” 97  *472  and assumed, without deciding, that experts should not be “permitted to testify that they are
100% certain of a match, to the exclusion of all other firearms.” 98  But the court noted that any such error in the instant case
was harmless because counsel had thoroughly cross-examined the expert and was able to highlight weaknesses in the expert's
levels of certainty, the expert's subjective conclusions, and the lack of demonstrative evidence. 99  In the court's view, “the
jury's assessment of this evidence surely did not turn on the difference between a ‘100% certain’ conclusion and a ‘reasonably
certain’ opinion.” 100  But such conclusions presume--perhaps too comfortably-- that cross-examination is an effective tool for
presenting frailties in forensic evidence.
Although studies show that jurors can be sensitive to the relative strength of cross-examination of an expert, 101  this does not
necessarily affect their perceptions of the quality of the evidence or their verdict. These studies should “give pause to anyone who
believes that the traditional tools of the adversarial process will always undo the adverse effects of weak expert testimony.” 102
The cases of United States v. Otero, 103  Melcher v. Holland, 104  and United States v. Mouzone 105  are examples of the latter
issue.
In Otero, the court accepted the significance of firearms-identification testimony to a jury but still failed to engage in the
problems that jurors have in digesting this evidence. The defendants moved to exclude firearms-identification testimony,
claiming that it was not reliable because it was based on the examiner's subjective opinion, instead of being based on objective
standards. 106  The court accepted that individualization claims “may well be somewhat overblown,” 107  but found testimony
indicating a match to a *473  “reasonable degree of professional certainty” was permissible. 108  One reason for this was that
“the relevance of such testimony to the charges against Defendants is manifest. Clearly, the evidence will assist the trier of fact
to determine a fact in issue,” i.e., the defendants' alleged involvement in an armed robbery. 109
In Melcher, the defendant challenged the admission of expert testimony that involved the phrases “practical certainty” and
the “impossibility of another source.” 110  Specifically, the trial court ordered that the expert should not testify that he was
“one hundred percent” sure. 111  But the expert did, in fact, state that the “chances of another firearm creating [the] exact same
pattern are so remote to be considered practically impossible.” 112  In response, the court recognized that other federal courts
differed on the proper form of this testimony in light of varying levels of concern about the reliability of firearms-identification
methodology 113  and acknowledged that the expert had come “close to the line” of expressing 100% certainty. 114  But the court
said that this had been tempered by cross-examination and jury instructions about evaluating expert testimony. 115  Moreover,
the court found that even if the expert's testimony should have been “reigned in” 116  to conform to Diaz or Glynn, no prejudice
“stemmed from the form [the expert] did use.” 117  The court found the difference between “practical certainty” and “considered
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practically impossible” “reasonable degree of certainty” or “more likely than not” would not tip the outcome of this case. 118
But the court did not explore why it would not tip the outcome.
*474  Similarly, in United States v. Mouzone, 119  the government's expert testified beyond the scope of what a district-court
judge had ordered was permissible. 120  The expert was ordered not to testify that it was a “practical impossibility” for different
firearms to have fired the suspect casings or that he was “certain” about his conclusions. 121  At trial, however, the expert
repeatedly testified that the casings found at two different murder scenes were “fired from the same firearm” and “there comes
a point where it's a practical impossibility .... That's when I'm convinced that these two [cartridge cases] were marked by the
same surface.” 122  Defense counsel's objections were overruled. 123  The defendants appealed, arguing that this testimony was
prejudicial because it painted them as killers. 124  The Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that the testimony only supported the
notion that the same weapon fired the casings recovered at each murder scene. In other words, it potentially connected the
firearm to both murders, thereby linking the murders to each other, but it did not prove that either defendant was responsible for
the casings at either murder scene. 125  As such, the court found that “to the extent that the jury concluded that the Appellants
were killers and allowed that conclusion to influence their final verdict, [the expert's] testimony was not the cause.” 126
Courts have even rejected challenges--on the basis that admitting the evidence was harmless--in cases where the type of evidence
used against the defendant has been officially discontinued. In 2011, the defendant in the case In re Personal Restraint of
Trapp 127  presented newly discovered evidence that included a letter from the FBI indicating that the Comparative Bullet
Lead Analysis 128  (CBLA) *475  evidence offered against him at trial was “potentially ‘misleading’ and ‘not supported by
science.”’ 129  At trial, the State's expert successfully linked crime-scene bullets to a box of bullets in the defendant's vehicle
using CBLA. 130  But the use of CBLA evidence was discontinued after a report questioning its validity was published in
2004. 131  The court rejected the defendant's application for relief because it found that he had not shown that the result would
be different if the CBLA evidence was recanted. 132
All of the aforementioned cases show courts rejecting challenges to firearms-identification evidence on the basis that the
evidence was harmless or not verdict-changing. But the courts simultaneously neglect to make a meaningful assessment of how
scientific evidence impacts jurors and how jurors digest it. This is an important consideration for multiple reasons.
First, and most significantly, the vast majority of jurors are not scientists. 133  Thus, many jurors have difficulty engaging with
scientific evidence accurately and, in particular, determining the appropriate weight to afford to specific testimony. This is an
especially relevant consideration in firearms-identification cases given the recent controversy surrounding how limits on expert
testimony should be phrased.
For example, McQuiston-Surrett and Saks conducted a study examining the impact that variations in the presentation of a
forensic expert's findings have on jurors. The study varied the language and concepts that the expert used to communicate the
results of *476  microscopic hair comparisons. The study found that jurors “inferred a higher probability that the defendant was
the source of the crime scene hair when the expert testimony was presented in the form of ‘match’ ..., ‘similar-in-all-microscopic-
characteristics' ..., or as an objective single-probability ... than when it was presented in a subjective-probability ... or objective
multiple-frequency format ... .” 134  It also found that the evidence had a significant impact on the jurors' determination of
guilt. 135  The study further showed that jurors “tended to yield to comforting certainties of expression about the evidence
being testified to;” 136  were “comfortable converting subjective probability evidence into findings of liability when the
expert assert[ed] a personal interpretation of a conclusion;” 137  and had difficulties “understanding statistical, and especially
probability, data, and underutilize[d] such information.” 138  Interestingly, the study found that judges were less influenced by
the expert's testimony than jurors were and “arriv[ed] at [lower] probability estimates that the defendant was the source of the
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crime scene evidence.” 139  Such findings raise the possibility that judges might substitute their own assessment of the evidence
for that of jurors. Judges may be more comfortable labeling the admission of such evidence as harmless or finding that a jury
could not have come to any particular conclusion in light of the record. The Jones, Mouzoune, and Trapp cases might well
be examples of this.
In addition, other scholars have noted that phrases such as “a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” could be confusing to
jurors. For instance, Bonnie Lanigan gives the example that “the phrase ‘ballistic certainty'--especially when ‘ballistics' is not an
accurate term as it encompasses all projectiles--may not sound that different to a juror from the phrase ‘scientific certainty.”’ 140
These findings are important to consider given the results in cases such as Otero, Trapp, Melcher, and Mouzone, where courts
effectively dismissed the impact of varying forms of expert testimony.
*477  Second, there is ample evidence that jurors consider forensic evidence “especially critical to their ultimate decision about
guilt.” 141  Jurors have a thirst for scientific evidence 142  and expect to see it, particularly in cases where the majority of the
evidence is circumstantial. 143  This issue alone should foster pause in cases like Trapp, where the remaining evidence against
the defendant was mostly circumstantial. In that case, the court arguably overlooked the significant impact the “scientific”
CBLA evidence could have had on the jury, compared to various circumstantial evidence, and the jurors' ability to attach relative
importance to it.
Third, scientific evidence has a high impact on jurors. “[R]esearch suggests that statements made by experts are given
considerable deference by jurors and their impact is likely not to be undone by cross-examination or rebuttal witnesses.” 144
Jurors may place even more trust in an expert who is subject to a vigorous cross examination as opposed to being more skeptical
about the reliability of the expert's evidence. As one study concluded:
One might have expected an explication of the examination process, emphasizing the guesswork involved,
would have a sobering effect on fact finders, but it appears instead to lead fact finders to be more
impressed by the examination. Similarly, since most jurors begin with an exaggerated view of the nature and
capabilities of forensic identification, one might expect that information explicitly informing fact finders
about the limitations of the expertise would temper the jurors' inferences. Such information had little effect
on jurors' judgments. 145
Moreover, jurors are not presented with the full picture. Instead, jurors “hear highly practiced alternative stories that only
roughly *478  approximate what might be termed reality.” 146  In terms of expert testimony, because of the adversarial model,
“information that reaches the legal system [and hence the jury] does not represent the scientific field more generally.” 147
Very often, jurors are presented with experts at the “margins of their disciplines [who] are chosen ... because they are willing
to be more extreme in the proponent's favor and thus come across as more certain of their conclusions.” 148  This approach
suggests the scientific field is more polarized than it actually is. 149  This has implications for cases like Jones that presume the
effectiveness of the adversarial system to weed out frailties and expose maverick experts.
In light of this, although preventing frivolous claims from flooding the system is a legitimate finality interest, challenges
to firearms-identification evidence--especially those challenging the use of expert testimony that suggests “individualized”
conclusions--may require a fresh assessment. This evidence likely has a high impact on already science-thirsty jurors, who find
comfort in alleged expert certainty and find it difficult to engage scientific evidence accurately. Courts should recognize this
problem when considering challenges to firearms-identification evidence. Before restricting post-conviction review, or other
motions, on the basis that such evidence is harmless or lacking in verdict-changing capacity, courts should more meaningfully
consider whether that truly is the case.
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B. Incentivizing Defense Counsel
Encouraging more efficient behavior by defense counsel is considered an “instrumental benefit” of finality. 150  When admitting
firearms-identification evidence, many courts place emphasis on the ability of defense counsel to weed out frailties in
forensic evidence via cross-examination. The criminal justice system “heavily depends upon the skill of counsel and in-court
confrontation rather than out-of-court oversight and structural reform.” 151  By underscoring the role of defense counsel (and
the adversarial system) when rejecting these challenges, the courts are reinforcing the idea that counsel should be preventing
errors at trial level, along with the idea that allowing more *479  lenient post-conviction review would effectively encourage
counsel to engage in “sandbagging.” 152  However, this overlooks one significant issue: counsel cannot always challenge this
evidence effectively.
For example, sometimes science has not yet provided counsel with the tools to challenge the evidence. In the 2012 case Kulbicki
v. State, 153  the defendant, who was convicted in 1995, alleged that he was denied a fair trial because the CBLA evidence
used against him was unreliable and the State had used “perjured, false, and misleading expert ballistics testimony.” 154  Using
CBLA, the State's expert testified that bullet fragments taken from the victim and from Kulbicki's truck were “analytically-
indistinguishable.” 155  The use of CBLA evidence was discontinued after the National Research Council concluded, in 2004,
that it was unreliable to conclude that a CBLA “match” supported other factual assertions at trial, such as that “matching bullets
came from the same box, the same manufacturer, were related in time or geography, or generally linked the defendant to the
crime in some unspecified manner.” 156  Still, the court affirmed the conviction, concluding, “Kulbicki's criticisms of CBLA
analysis concern the proper weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. It can hardly be said, therefore, that the adversarial
system was not competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.” 157
The problem, however, is that both of Kulbicki's convictions occurred a decade before CBLA evidence was discontinued.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, counsel neither challenged the expert's credentials nor the reliability of his “science” on cross-
examination. The simple fact is that defense counsel did not have the tools or knowledge to challenge the evidence. 158  Although
defense counsel's *480  failure to object to the CBLA evidence or undermine its reliability would, post-2004, be plainly
erroneous, counsel's decisions were “ostensibly reasonable at the time they were made.” 159  Note that a similar issue can be
seen in the case of In re Trapp discussed above.
Numerous other cases show defense counsel struggling to adequately challenge forensic-identification testimony. In United
States v. Perkins, 160  the defendant argued that the government should have been precluded from presenting firearms-
identification evidence. The expert was not certified by the AFTE and had never “had his competency objectively assessed.
He did not testify about his error rates, the error rates of his laboratory, or the error rates of his field generally.” 161  Appellate
counsel, relying on Green, 162  challenged the admissibility of the evidence on the basis that it did not satisfy Daubert. But
because defense counsel made no objections at trial, the court found there was no occasion for a Daubert analysis. 163  The
court stated that Green was
not very helpful to Perkins because the court there emphasized that the “issue is not whether the field in general uses a reliable
methodology, but the reliability of the expert's methodology in the case at bar.” Because no challenge was made at trial to the
admissibility of the testimony now challenged here, the record provides no basis for this court to review the reliability of this
expert's methodology in this case. We therefore neither accept nor reject the *481  analysis of Green, as we simply conclude
that the issues considered in that case are not before us. 164
Defense counsel also displayed deficiencies in United States v. Sebbern. 165  Based on the criticisms detailed in the Forensic
Science Report, particularly those aimed at the subjectivity of the AFTE Theory, the defendants argued that the State should
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be precluded from presenting firearms-identification evidence. The court denied the motion and criticized the approach taken
by counsel. The court noted the defendants' preclusion argument was “unsupported by any legal authority” and merely cited
Daubert, Green, and Glynn. 166  Daubert had not been applied and the cases had not been discussed. The court then engaged
with a plethora of relevant cases that the defense seemingly overlooked and concluded no case, including Glynn or Green,
supported precluding the testimony. 167  The court acknowledged that these cases may support a request to limit the degree of
confidence “which the expert can express with respect to his findings” 168  but then continued to underscore that this somewhat
obvious route had been neglected:
However, while the headnote of Mr. Sebbern's motion argues that, “The Government's ‘Expert’ on Firearms Identification
Should be Precluded or Limited,” the rest of the motion neither makes further mention of, nor proposes, any limitations. Since
the motion does not argue for a specific limitation and since the government's response does not address this issue, this Court
cannot address it at this juncture. 169
Similar deficiencies are showcased in Thomas v. State. 170  The defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
that suspect bullets had been fired by a gun recovered from his home on the basis that his counsel was not able to cross-examine
the first *482  expert analyst who made the comparison. The court rejected the appeal on the basis that defense counsel had
not explored the issue at a pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility of the firearms evidence. 171
In Jones v. United States, 172  discussed above, defense counsel failed to present an opposing expert. The defendant argued that
the trial court should have at least precluded the government's experts from stating their conclusions with “absolute certainty
excluding all other possible firearms.” 173  The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, reasoning that defense counsel had
cross-examined the expert thoroughly and therefore had given the jury an opportunity to assess the evidence. 174  In fact, the
court noted counsel had even used the expert's expressions of certainty to the defendant's advantage, suggesting that the expert
was simply telling the jury to “trust me.” 175  But significantly, the court pointed out that the defense failed to present its own
expert evidence:
Defense counsel did not present an expert to explain the difference or to opine that the government
examiners' confidence in their results was unjustifiably exaggerated. Nor did the defense put on an expert
to point out any weaknesses in the methodology employed by the government experts. In fact, even though
the trial court made it possible for the defense to conduct an independent test, it chose not to have an expert
testify at all. 176
All of the aforementioned cases show counsel having difficulties in challenging firearms-identification evidence. Counsel
may not have couched their arguments effectively, as in Perkins and Sebbern, or failed to do something more specific, like
hire an expert, make an objection, or cross-examine, as in Thomas, Jones, and Sebbern. These cases show that the courts are
acknowledging counsels' deficiencies but not unpicking why counsel may have made these inadvertent mistakes or, indeed,
strategic decisions. The reasons why, of course, may be many and varied, but one important rationale *483  courts should not
overlook--but seemingly do--is that counsel encounter specific difficulties when engaging with forensic science.
There are a number of reasons why this rationale might be significant. First, as Professor Frederic I. Lederer notes, “[L]awyers
generally lack significant scientific training. This educational deficiency often places lawyers at a disadvantage when confronted
with scientific evidence .... [L]awyers ... often fail to ask the right questions and uncritically accept scientific assertions.” 177  The
Forensic Science Report also recognized that this was a significant issue, stating--eleven times--that “lawyers and judges often
have insufficient training and background in scientific methodology, and they often fail to fully comprehend the approaches
employed by different forensic science disciplines and the reliability of forensic science evidence that is offered in trial.” 178
This deficiency is often attributed to a science and math “black hole” in legal education--“a black hole that becomes harder
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to close the more removed it is from law school.” 179  Consequently, “[a]s lawyers, we are ill-equipped to speak the language
of science.” 180
In light of this, it is unsurprising that lawyers fail to make appropriate objections, employ useful strategies, hire relevant experts,
and ask potent questions on cross and direct examination or in admissibility hearings, as exemplified in the cases above. Of
course, lawyers might rationally choose to not object to errors, “hoping for a favorable outcome from the flawed proceeding
but calling foul if the attorneys are displeased with the results.” 181  But Kim argues that a
careful analysis reveals the risk of strategic behavior to be an illusion visible only in hindsight. Granting relief from errors not
objected to at trial can only encourage strategic behavior by attorneys if the *484  attorneys know, ex ante, that their clients
will have a reasonable likelihood of obtaining relief on appeal. 182
Given the legal landscape, this sort of strategy does not make sense in firearms-identification cases. Legal authorities clearly
indicate that appeals on such grounds are routinely denied, and courts underscore the utility of cross-examination to weed out
frailties in forensic evidence. In addition, as discussed above, the application of harmless-error rules also makes this sort of
strategy “highly irrational” 183  because courts tend to label even overstated firearms-identification evidence as non-prejudicial.
The above cases also demonstrate Professor Saks's point that counsel's inability to engage with science means that counsel can
overlook the most accessible and vital information. Saks gives the following example:
The National Academy of Sciences was asked by the FBI to evaluate voice spectrography used for the
purpose of identifying suspects, and the Academy assembled a diverse and first-rate panel of experts
to examine the scientific evidence on the question. The Academy published a detailed report of their
conclusions, which the FBI promptly adverted to. Lawyers in trials around the country failed to find and
bring the report to the attention of judges, judges failed to find the report, and several courts which clearly
knew of the report failed to learn from it. 184
Saks concludes that “the adversarial process failed to motivate lawyers to find and offer the most important evidence on the
subject at issue.” 185  The Sebbern case demonstrates this issue clearly in the context of firearms-identification evidence. In that
case, appellate counsel did not locate clearly relevant legal authorities and therefore missed the opportunity to apply them in
favor of his client. What is really concerning is that counsel neglected to identify vital legal sources--his bread and butter--rather
than scientific literature, which is arguably less accessible. This issue may also be highlighted by the *485  many lawyers who
continue to apply for wholesale exclusion of firearms-identification evidence on the basis it is unreliable, rather than construct
narrower arguments aimed at limiting expert testimony. The courts are clearly not persuaded that such evidence is inadmissible,
but there is ample authority to couch an effective argument that such testimony should be limited.
A second reason why courts should not overlook the specific difficulties counsel may encounter with forensic science relates to
resources. The availability of resources is important when discussing the restriction of post-conviction review on the basis that
it incentivizes defense counsel to perform effectively at trial. As Kim explains, while “persuasive in the abstract, as a practical
matter, reducing the number of trial errors would generally require attorneys to spend more time and resources representing each
client.” 186  Most attorneys already ration the time they have with each client, so although restricted post-conviction review may
make defense counsel want to provide enhanced representation, it “will generally have little effect on the actual representation
they provide.” 187  Forensic experts can be expensive to hire and time-consuming to apply for; counsel cannot “magic up” these
resources (along with an adequate scientific knowledge to engage competently with the expert) simply because post-conviction
review is limited. 188
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A third reason why courts consider the specific difficulties counsel may encounter with forensic science is the limitations of
the adversarial system itself. As discussed above, research shows that cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses do not dilute
the impact of individualization testimony given by experts. As Saks and McQusiton-Surrett explain, “[U]nfortunately, cross-
examination and the use of opposing experts do not appear to effectively counter expert testimony, regardless of the logical
vulnerability of the initial expert testimony.” 189  There are similar findings in mock-jury studies:
*486  For example, in mock jury studies about the effectiveness of cross-examination, it apparently made
little difference whether the defense challenged the expert testimony; whether the defense pointed out in
cross examination that the expert's conclusions were inconsistent with prior research and that the expert had
not followed standard methodology; whether the defense not only cross-examined the prosecution expert,
but also put on its own expert. Although the jurors discussed the expert evidence in their deliberations, and
although there was a strong correlation between the prosecution expert's testimony and the jury's verdict
preferences, the results did not vary among the first three conditions. 190
For example, although the court highlighted that trial counsel in Jones did not provide relevant rebuttal experts, it is likely that
any such testimony would not have overcome the State's case, especially as it likely accorded with “beliefs and expectations
already held by the jurors.” 191  Jurors appear to have inflated expectations of the capabilities of forensic science to match
suspects to crimes, 192  so given the expert in Jones connected the defendant's firearm to the crime with certainty, rebuttal
expert evidence (and cross examination) may well have been fruitless. The adversarial process is not a cure for shaky expert
forensic evidence.
Thus, defense counsel is tackling firearms-identification cases with blunt tools, including counsel's own scientific knowledge
and ability to engage with scientific evidence, limited resources, and a low-impact and depleted adversarial arsenal. Courts
should recognize these limitations when considering challenges to firearms-identification evidence. Before restricting post-
conviction review, or other motions, on the basis that counsel should get it right the first time, courts should recognize that
this is likely very difficult to do.
V. CONCLUSION
By focusing on firearms-identification evidence, this Article has set out the controversy between finality and the impact of
forensic- *487  identification evidence in criminal cases. Two particular finality interests are prominent in court decisions
rejecting challenges to firearms-identification evidence-- namely preventing frivolous claims from flooding the system and
incentivizing defense counsel to perform more effectively. In relation to the former, courts often conclude that admitting
firearms-identification evidence was non-prejudicial or harmless in light of other evidence against the defendant. In relation
to the latter, the courts emphasize the importance of the adversarial system--defense counsels' ability to weed out frailties in
forensic evidence via cross-examination.
Recent cases challenging firearms-identification evidence showcase the influence and implications of these finality interests on
judicial decision-making. By rationalizing their decisions in this way, judges are overlooking important difficulties both lawyers
and jurors have when engaging with forensic-identification evidence. Specifically, when terming the unsound admission of
such evidence as harmless, courts are overlooking the high impact that scientific evidence has on already science-thirsty jurors
who find comfort in alleged expert certainty, have inflated expectations of science, and have general difficulties engaging with
scientific evidence accurately. Similarly, when emphasizing the role of defense counsel (and the adversarial system) to weed out
frailties in forensic evidence, courts overlook that counsel is often equipped with only blunt tools in the form of counsel's own
scientific knowledge and ability to engage with scientific evidence, limited resources, and a low-impact adversarial arsenal.
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By choosing “finality at all costs,” the criminal justice system is “destined to court either scandal or injustice, and perhaps
both.” 193  This statement should resonate in cases involving challenges to forensic-identification evidence, given 47% of the
now 329 post-conviction DNA-evidence exonerations in America are attributable, in some way, to invalidated or unreliable
forensic evidence. 194  In light of this, and the points raised in this Article, the courts should *488  take new perspectives on
these finality interests in such cases and more meaningfully consider the issues that arise when law consumes science.
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